Follow-on Case to DOJ Blue Cross Blue Shield Prosecution to Move Forward

In Aetna Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, Eastern Distict of Michigan Judge Denise Page Hood struck down Blue Cross’ motion to dismiss Aetna’s complaint alleging that Blue Cross Blue Shield entered antitcompetitive agreements prohibiting about half of the state’s 131 hospitals from offering more favorable terms to competing insurers.  As a result, Aetna alleged, competitors had to pay higher medical care costs, preventing them from lowering premiums to compete with Blue Cross.  The case follows on a Department of Justice prosecution making similar allegations.  That case is scheduled for an April 2013 trial.

The court rejected the defendants’ claim that Aetna had alleged harm to only one competitor.  Judge Hood explained that under Sixth Circuit law, “a dominant party” will trigger antitrust scrutiny when it “use[s] contracts and its current market dominance to establish unreasonable barriers to entry in the future.”

Court Denies Blue Cross’ Motion to Compel Disclosure of Competitor and Consumer Interviews

In United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, Eastern District of Michigan Judge Mona K. Majzoub denied a motion to compel, filed by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, seeking information the government collected in interviews with competitors and customers gathered while investing the case.  In its suit, the government accuses Blue Cross of using most-favored-nation clauses in contracts with more than half of Michigan’s general acute-care hospitals to curb competition and raise prices on health care services and insurance in Michigan.  In its motion to compel, Blue Cross argued that the contested interrogatories seek facts that the government gathered before it filed suit, and not mental impressions or strategy.  The plaintiffs argue that this factual information is not protected by the work-product doctrine.  The court disagreed and denied Blue Cross’ motion to compel; holding that Blue Cross did not meet its burden to show it has a substantial need and the inability to otherwise obtain the information because both parties have equal means of obtaining the information.

Second Circuit Affirms that Blackberry’s Backing out of Joint Production Deal Not Anticompetitive

In Eatoni Ergonomics Inc. v. Research in Motion Corp. et al, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that BlackBerry maker Research In Motion Ltd. (RIM) did not violate the antitrust laws when it backed out of a joint product development deal with Eastoni Ergonomics.

In 2004, Eatoni accused RIM’s BlackBerry devices of infringing its intellectual property on the reduced QWERTY keyboard.  The parties settled that dispute with RIM agreeing to (1) invest $2 million in Eatoni and (2) collaborate to improve predictive text cellphone keyboards. Eatoni agreed to license its patent.  When RIM decided to end the collaboration, the parties took the dispute to arbitration and the decision favored RIM.  Eatoni then filed this antitrust action alleging that RIM had monopolized the market for the reduced QWERTY devices.

The court held that the law does not impose a duty requiring RIM to work with the plaintiff, and the settlement required only bargaining in good faith, a standard that RIM met.  Further, the court held that allegations of patent infringement do not constitute an antitrust claim.

Stay Lifted in Multidistrict Automotive Lighting Case

In In re: Aftermarket Automotive Lighting Products Antitrust Litigation, Central District of California Judge George H. Wu lifted a stay on multidistrict litigation against automotive lighting manufacturer Eagle Eyes Traffic Industrial Co. Ltd.  Although a parallel criminal case is on-going, Judge Wu concluded that the plaintiffs would suffer from additional delay. 

In 2008, direct purchasers of automotive lighting filed a class action, and some defendants settled.  After the  Department of Justice indicted Eagle Eyes (a non-settling defendant) and two executives, the court stayed the case. The plaintiffs moved to lift the stay after the trial date for the criminal proceeding was moved back to September, arguing that delay would make it harder to present their case.  In overturning the stay, Judge Wu expressed skepticism that the September date would hold up.  Although he ordered the parties to move forward, he stated that he would defer to the court handling the criminal case on discovery matters.

Direct Purchaser Class Certified in Railroad Fuel Surcharge Case

In In re: Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, multi-district litigation, District of Columbia Paul L. Friedman certified a class of direct purchasers who are alleging that several railroad companies fixed shipping prices through an arbitrary fuel surcharge.  The class was defined as anyone who purchased “rate-unregulated rail freight transport services” directly from at least one of the defendants — Union Pacific Railroad Co., BNSF Railway Co., CSX Transportation Inc. and Norfolk Southern Railway Co. — and paid a standalone fuel surcharge from July 1, 2003, until Dec. 31, 2008, either (1) as a percentage of the base rate for transport, or (2) in the base rate through a process known as “rebasing.”  The court’s opinion has been filed under seal.

U.S. Supreme Court Requires Jury Findings on Facts Supporting Criminal Fines

In Southern Union Co. v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that any fact used to increase a maximum penalty must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  That core principal, the court held, applies to criminal fines as well as jail sentences. 

Until recently, it was assumed that the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, could seek fines above the Sherman Act’s $100 million maximum for companies merely by proving to a judge by a preponderance of evidence that a guilty defendant had wrongly gained, or caused others to lose, more than the statutory maximum.  It is now clear that the government must present the issue to a jury and prove the amount of harm or wrongful profit beyond a reasonable about.  The holding will make economic analysis of profit and loss data more important in calculating appropriate fines in criminal antitrust cases.

US Supreme Court Grants Cert. to Resolve State Action and Class Action Disputes

In the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) prosecution of the Phoebe Putney Health System Inc. merger, the U.S. Supreme Court will clarify the degree of specificity that state lawmakers must use in adopting an anticompetitive state regulation in order to secure an exemption from the federal antitrust laws. 

The Eleventh Circuit upheld Phoebe Putney’s $195 million acquisition of its only nearby rival even though the merger produced a monopoly in the local market.  The lower court held that the merger was exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine.  That doctrine exempts state laws articulating a clear anticompetitive state policy so long as the conduct is actively supervised by state authorities.  A 1941 Georgia law created a system of hospital authorities to manage the health care providers and it included the power to acquire other hospitals.  

The Eleventh Circuit found that this state law expressed a clearly articulated anticompetitive policy because the state lawmakers must have realized that acquisitions in rural markets with few hospitals, which were authorized by the law, would harm competition.  But the FTC has countered that the state law simply conveys a general set of corporate powers on the state authority, including the power to make acquisitions.  Nothing in the law suggests approval of a merger-to-monopoly.

The Supreme Court last addressed the clear articulation prong of the state action test in the early 1980s.  Then, it held that although a general grant of home rule authority to a city did not satisfy the doctrine, a specific grant to regulate the water supply did.  In those cases, the Court held that an anticompetitive outcome must be reasonably foreseeable from the state legislature’s action.

In a second case, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to decide whether its prior decisions require a trial court to address substantive class questions, particularly whether common or individual claims predominated, before certifying the class.  The Court phrased the question presented as follows: “whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a classwide basis.”

In this case, a group of Philadelphia-area cable subscribers allege that Comcast Corp. unlawfully monopolized the local cable market.

Microsoft Loses Bid to Overturn EU Fine

The European Commission fined Microsoft a $1.1 billion dollars for abusing its dominant position in the operating system market.  Microsoft challenged the fine, but the EU General Court upheld it, requiring the software giant to license on reasonable terms interoperability data needed by firms writing programs that would be compatible with Windows.  The decision bolsters the Commission’s ability to regulate large electronics companies in industries relying on standards.  

Microsoft’s principal complaint with the fine was that the concept of a fair rate was uncertain and vague.  The General Court disagreed, finding that the 2004 pricing principles that the Commission and Microsoft agreed upon provided all the information that the company needed to determine whether its interoperability information rates were reasonable.  Moreover, the court placed a burden on Microsoft to offer reasonable rates in the first instance, not after a dispute resolution process.  Such a process could not restore the lost opportunity for competition while the rates were too high.  “That finding,” the court explained, “is particularly relevant in the context of markets which are evolving rapidly and in which the development of products such as those at issue is dependent on investments where the fixed cost is very high and must be calculable in advance by interested parties.”

En banc Seventh Circuit Revives Potash Case, Interpreting FTAIA as Non-Jurisdictional

In Minn-Chem Inc. et al. v. Agrium Inc. et al., the Seventh Circuit reversed a panel decision dismissing a suit against potash producers allegedly involved in a cartel. The en banc panel found that, under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), there was a sufficient connection between the alleged plot involving foreign producers and the impact on the U.S. potash market.

Overruling circuit precedent, and citing the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia, the en banc court held that the FTAIA’s limits on cases involving foreign conduct relate to the merits of the claim and are NOT jurisdictional.  The court held that this interpretation was necessary to meaningfully check foreign cartels.  Foreign countries, the court commented, “would logically be pleased to reap economic rents from other countries” and thus would have little incentive to prosecute cartels.  “It is the U.S. authorities or private plaintiffs,” the court explained, “who have the incentive — and the right — to complain about overcharges paid as a result of the potash cartel, and whose interests will be sacrificed if the law is interpreted not to permit this kind of case.”

The 2008 complaint alleged that a cartel among potash producers between 2003 and 2008 increased prices 600%.  The en banc court made clear that its decision on the jurisdictional question should not be read as a comment on the merits or any other potential defense.

Arbitration Rejected in Private E-books Case

In In re: Electronic Books Antitrust Litigation, multi-district litigation, Southern District of New York Judge Denise Cote rejected publisher Penguin Group’s motion to compel arbitration for plaintiffs who purchased e-books from Amazon or Barnes & Noble, both of which contain arbitration clauses in their purchase agreements.  The complaint accuses Penguin and other publishers of fixing prices for electronic books. 

The court held that even if the arbitration agreements were generally enforceable, requiring arbitration of Sherman Act claims would prevent the proposed class from asserting its federal rights.  The court found that it would be economically irrational for any plaintiff to bring an individual arbitration claim.  “Plaintiffs can expect at most a median recovery of $540 in treble damages,” the court explained, “and [each would] face several hundred thousand dollars to millions of dollars in expert expenses alone.”